In the 1930s, Germany and Japan began to build up their military power and agitate for more territory. The Japanese invaded Manchuria in 1931, and the Germans took the Rhineland in 1936. Their goal of world domination was not a secret, as the following two memos suggest. The first was written by Douglas Miller, an official at the United States embassy in Berlin; the second was written by Joseph Grew, the U.S. ambassador to Japan.

**Think Through History: Comparing**

What are the similarities between the memos from Douglas Miller and Joseph Grew?

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**Memorandum to the U.S. Embassy [In Berlin]**

April 17, 1934

*Main Purpose of Nazis.* The fundamental purpose is to secure a greater share of the world’s future for the Germans, the expansion of German territory and growth of the German race until it constitutes the largest and most powerful nation in the world, and ultimately, according to some Nazi leaders, until it dominates the entire globe.

The German people suffering from a traditional inferiority complex, smarting from their defeat in the war and the indignities of the post-war period, disillusioned in their hopes of a speedy return to prosperity along traditional lines, inflamed by irresponsible demagogic slogans and flattered by the statement that their German racial inheritance gives them inherent superior rights over other peoples, have to a large measure adopted the National Socialist point of view for the time being.

*Economic Aims.* There are two other purposes subsidiary to the main purpose. Germany is to be made the economic center of a self-sustaining territorial block whose dependent nations in Central and Eastern Europe will look to Berlin for leadership. This block is to be so constituted that it can defy wartime blockade and be large enough to give the peoples in it the benefits of free trade now enjoyed by the 48 American States.

*Social Aims.* The second subsidiary purpose is the welding of all individuals in the present and future Greater Germany into a homogeneous racial family, gladly

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1. demagogic: using false claims and promises
obedient to the will of its leader, with class and cultural differences inside the country eliminated, but a sharp line drawn between Germans and the foreign world outside. In carrying out this purpose, the Jews are to be entirely eliminated, the Slavic or eastern elements in the population to be minimized and eventually bred out of the race. A national religion is in process of organization; trade unions, political parties and all social, political, cultural, trade or other organizations not affiliated with the National Socialist party, have been abolished, the individual’s rights have been largely taken away. In the future the nation is to count for everything, the individual for nothing. Germany is to engage in a gigantic struggle with the rest of the world to grow at the expense of its neighbors. The German population owes the nation the patriotic duty of supporting it and bringing forward all necessary sacrifices to reach the common goal.

Retention of Power. To these long-distance objectives must be added the fourth and most important purpose of all, namely to retain control at all costs. The National Socialist party may compromise on distant objectives, if necessary, but cannot compromise on a question of retaining its absolute hold on the German people. This control had been gained by making most irresponsible and extravagant promises; by the studied use of the press, the radio, public meetings, parades, flags, uniforms, and all methods of working on popular psychology and finally by the use of force. . . .

Danger of War. The Nazis are not satisfied with the existing map of Europe. They are at heart belligerent and aggressive. True, they desire nothing more than a period of peace for several years in which they can gradually rearm and discipline their people. This period may be 5 years, 10 years, or longer, but the more completely their experiments succeed the more certain is a large-scale war in Europe some day.

Nazis Want to Wipe Out 1918. In estimating the aims and purposes of the National Socialist movement, we must not make the mistake of putting too much reliance on public statements designed for consumption abroad which breathe the spirit of good will and will and assert the intention of the Government to promote the welfare of the German people and good relations with their neighbors. Nor should we imagine that the present Government leaders will feel and act as we would in their circumstances, namely think only of Germany’s welfare. The real emotional drive behind the Nazi program is not so much love of their own country as dislike of other countries. The Nazis will never be content in merely promoting the welfare of the German people. They desire to be feared and envied by foreigners and to wipe out the memory of 1918 by inflicting humiliations in particular upon the French, the Poles, the Czechs and anybody else they can get their hands on.

A careful examination of Hitler’s book and his public speeches reveals the fact that he cannot be considered as absolutely sane and normal on this subject. The same is true of many other Nazi leaders. They have capitalized the wounded inferiority complex of the German people, and magnified their own bitter feelings into

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2. belligerent: having a fighting attitude, warlike

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a cult of dislike against the foreign world which is past the bounds of ordinary
good sense and reason. Let us repeat this fact and let it sink in: the National
Socialist movement is building a tremendous military machine, physically very
poorly armed, but morally aggressive and belligerent. The control of this machine
lies in the hands of narrow, ignorant and unscrupulous adventurers who have
been slightly touched with madness from brooding over Germany’s real or imag-
ined wrongs, as well as the slight and indignities thrown in their own individual
way as they attempted to organize the movement. Power of this kind concentrated
in hands like these is dangerous. The Nazis are determined to secure more power
and more territory in Europe. If this is voluntarily given to them by peaceful
means, well and good, but if not, they will certainly use force. That is the only
meaning behind the manifold activities of the movement in Germany today.

[Douglas Miller]

The Ambassador in Japan [Grew] to the U.S. Secretary of State
Tokyo, December 27, 1934

It is difficult for those who do not live in Japan to appraise the present temper
of the country. An American Senator, according to reports, has recently recom-
mended that we should accord parity to Japan in order to avoid future war.
Whatever the Senator’s views may be concerning the general policy that we should
follow in the Far East, he probably does not realize what harm that sort of public
statement does in strengthening the Japanese stand and in reinforcing the aggres-
sive ambitions of the expansionists. The Japanese press of course picks out such
statements by prominent Americans and publishes them far and wide, thus con-
firming the general belief in Japan that the pacifist element in the United States is
preponderantly strong and in the last analysis will control the policy and action of
our Government. Under such circumstances there is a general tendency to charac-
terize our diplomatic representations as bluff and to believe that they can safely be
disregarded without fear of implementation. It would be helpful if those who
share the Senator’s views could hear and read some of the things that are con-
stantly being said and written in Japan, to the effect that Japan’s destiny is to sub-
jugate and rule the world (sic), and could realize the expansionist ambitions which
lie not far from the surface in the minds of certain elements in the Army and
Navy, the patriotic societies and the intense nationalists throughout the country.
Their aim is to obtain trade control and eventually predominant political influence
in China, the Philippines, the Straits Settlements, Siam and the Dutch East Indies,
the Maritime Provinces and Vladivostok, one step at a time, as in Korea and
Manchuria, pausing intermittently to consolidate and then continuing as soon as
the intervening obstacles can be overcome by diplomacy or force. With such
dreams of empire cherished by many, and with an army and navy capable of tak-
ing the bit in their own teeth and running away with it regardless of the restrain-
ing influence of the saner heads of the Government in Tokyo (a risk which
unquestionably exists and of which we have already had ample evidence in the

3. expansionists: people who seek to expand a nation’s boundaries
Manchurian affair), we would be reprehensibly somnolent if we were to trust to
the security of treaty restraints or international comity to safeguard our own inter-
est interests or, indeed, our own property. . . .

At this point I should like to make the following observation. From reading this
despatch, and perhaps from other reports periodically submitted by the Embassy,
one might readily get the impression that we are developing something of an
“anti-Japanese” complex. This is not the case. One can dislike and disagree with
certain members of a family without necessarily feeling hostility to the family
itself. . . .

Having placed the foregoing considerations on record, I have less hesitation in
reiterating and emphasizing with all conviction the potential dangers of the situa-
tion and the prime importance of American national preparedness to meet it. As a
nation we have taken the lead in international efforts towards the restriction and
reduction of armaments. We have had hopes that the movement would be pro-
gressive, but the condition of world affairs as they have developed during the past
twelve years since the Washington Conference has not afforded fruitful ground for
such progress. Unless we are prepared to subscribe to a “Pax Japonica” in the Far
East, with all that this movement, as conceived and interpreted by Japan, is bound
to entail, we should rapidly build up our navy to treaty strength, and if and when
the Washington Naval Treaty expires we should continue to maintain the present
ratio with Japan regardless of cost, a peacetime insurance both to cover and to
reduce the risk of war. In the meantime every proper step should be taken to avoid
or to offset the belligerent utterances of jingoists no less than the defeatist state-
ments of pacifists in the United States, many of which find their way into the
Japanese press, because the utterances of the former tend to enflame public senti-
ment against our country, while the statements of the latter convey an impres-
sion of American weakness, irresolution and bluff.

Theodore Roosevelt enunciated the policy “Speak softly but carry a big stick.”
If our diplomacy in the Far East is to achieve favorable results, and if we are to
reduce the risk of an eventual war with Japan to a minimum, that is the only way
to proceed. Such a war may be unthinkable, and so it is, but the specter of it is
always present and will be present for some time to come.

Respectfully yours,

Joseph C. Grew

Source: Excerpt from Peace and War: United States Foreign Policy, 1931–1941,
compiled by the U.S. Department of State (Washington, D.C.: Government